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Contracts
By Luther P. Cochrane* and Curtis W. Martin**

This year's contract decisions offer a review of some legal issues of first
impression, along with a refinement and restatement of positions taken
previously by the State's appellate courts. Among other decisions, the
court of appeals has ruled that an employee may recover benefits described in an employer's brochure in spite of a master employment plan
that stated benefits in a more limited fashion.' The supreme court has
refined the law governing covenants restricting competition, distinguishing between such covenants in employment contracts and sale-of-business
contracts.' This article discusses that distinction and its implications. Our
appellate courts also continued their strict view that a contract may vest
absolute discretion in one party and eliminate any implied duty of good
faith.3 These decisions, among others, are the subject of this review.
One of the most interesting cases decided this year by Georgia's jurists
involved principles of estoppel applied to an employee's attempt to recover benefits described in a company brochure. In Hercules, Inc. v. Adams,4 the brochure given to the employee painted a broader picture of
available benefits than were actually provided in the company's more detailed compensation plan, which the employee never saw. The employer's
brochure stated that it would pay an injured worker the difference between Georgia workmen's compensation benefits and lost wages, without
specifying any time limit on such benefits. The master plan provided for
those benefits, but only up to thirteen months, giving the company the
option to pay further benefits beyond that time. Plaintiff employee
* Partner in the firm of Griffin, Cochrane & Marshall, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. University
of North Carolina (B.A., 1970; J.D., 1974). Member of the State Bar of Georgia and American Bar Association.
** Associate in the firm of Griffin, Cochrane & Marshall, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Duke
(A.B., 1974); Harvard (J.D. 1979). Member of the State Bar of Georgia and American Bar
Association.
1. Hercules, Inc. v. Adams, 150 Ga. App. 223, 257 S.E.2d 289 (1979).
2. Jenkins v. Jenkins Irrigation, Inc., 244 Ga. 94, 259 S.E.2d 47 (1979).
3. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Anderson, 243 Ga. 867, 257 S.E.2d 283 (1979).
4. 150 Ga. App. 223, 257 S.E.2d 289 (1979).
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moved for summary judgment on the basis of the employer's summary of
benefits and that motion was granted. On appeal, the court of appeals
held that a summary of the terms of an employee benefit plan control the
outcome of the case in spite of the existence of a more detailed master
plan, but only where the trier of fact determines that the employee reasonably relied upon the summary of benefits and was not put on notice of
a different and controlling master plan.
The court held that such a brochure could establish an obligation to
provide benefits described therein. The issue argued by the three dissenting justices was whether the employee benefit summary relied upon by
plaintiff established the employer's liability as a matter of law. The dissenting justices argued that the employee had no actual notice of the existence of a contradictory master plan, and that summary judgment was
appropriate. The majority rejected this approach, however, saying that
the brochure established an obligation to provide the described benefits
only if the brochure was reasonably interpreted to reflect such an intent,
without qualification. Adopting the test of Gallo v. Howard Stores Corp.,6
the majority held that the brochure would bind the employer, even "without any intention to assume legal obligations, where such conduct and
words [in the summary] would be understood by a reasonable man of ordinary intelligence that such words and conduct reflected his [the employer's] intention."' Following this rationale, the majority remanded the
case for a determination as to whether the information contained in the
summary booklet placed the employee "on notice that the booklet contained a summarization-which was not binding. . . "'i and that a master
plan provided more limited benefits.
This case represents a new source of liability for employers whose benefit plans are summarized in booklets provided to employees. However,
under the court's ruling, the trier of fact must hold that the policy does
not put the employee on notice of another controlling and potentially different plan. Whether this case should have been remanded to the trier of
fact is less important than the right of recovery set forth by this decision.
The court finds an obligation established by a brochure describing benefits, basing its rationale upon the actual construction of the words contained in the employer's benefit summary. If the summary implies an intent to provide benefits, then the employer is bound by the summary,
regardless of its actual purpose. The employee's interpretation of the
availability of benefits need only be reasonable. Thus, the court has found
a possible obligation implied by an employer's statement in a brochure,
5.
6.
7.

145 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
150 Ga. App. at 227, 257 S.E.2d at 291.
Id., 257 S.E.2d at 292.
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regardless of actual intent, consideration, or action taken in reliance on
the statement. The court does not specify its basis for the decision, but
its concern for the reasonable interpretation of the brochure's promises
suggests a theory of estoppel to be applied to an employer's statements
regarding benefits.
The past year's decisions reveal a substantial number of cases seeking
interpretation of restrictive covenants arising out of employment agreements. Most of these decisions routinely interpret those restrictive covenants in accordance with general principles governing the enforceability
of such agreements only when they are properly limited. However, in Jenkins v. Jenkins Irrigation,Inc.,8 the supreme court held that a restrictive
covenant associated with the sale of a business would be interpreted far
more liberally than restrictive covenants associated with employment.
The case arose out of a restrictive covenant in a contract where a fifty
percent shareholder of a business sold his stock to another party. The
court held that the territorial restriction in the covenant was unreasonable, but nevertheless stated that the covenant would be upheld by applying the "blue pencil" theory of severability. The court in effect rewrote
the territorial limitation to encompass a smaller, more reasonable area
and upheld the restrictive covenant as modified. The court thus treated
this covenant associated with the sale of a business far more liberally
than those ancillary to employment contracts.
The court's rationale for this different treatment was based upon the
seller's receipt of full consideration for executing the agreement. The
court reasoned that in a sale of a business covenant the seller "receives an
equivalent for his partial abstention from that business in the increased
price paid for it on account of his covenant. .

.

.

",

The court asserted

that the ability to sign such a covenant enhances the seller's position by
allowing him to get the full benefit of the sale of the company, including
its good will.
To the extent that the court's rationale rests upon this theory of additional consideration received by the seller for the signing of a restrictive
covenant, we must necessarily compare this situation to a covenant associated with an employment contract. It could be argued that by signing
an agreement not to compete, an employee may under some circumstances bargain for and receive greater compensation in exchange for the
agreement not to compete as the seller of a business receives greater value
for his sale of stock. While it may be true that employees are generally in
a less favorable bargaining position than sellers of stock, the court's
rationale as to the consideration received for the restrictive covenant
8.
9.

244 Ga. 94, 259 S.E.2d 47 (1979).
Id. at 98, 259 S.E.2d at 50.
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necessarily rests on an arbitrary line, assuming as it does that the seller
has greater ability to bargain for consideration for the restrictive covenant than does the employee. The court has made the judgment that the
seller of a business is more likely to receive compensation for his undertaking the covenant than is the employee. This generalization is probably
defensible, because in most circumstances the seller of a business has
more bargaining power than an employee, and thus could expect to receive greater consideration for the execution of the restrictive covenant.
However, it must also be recognized that employees under some circumstances would similarly have the ability to bargain for consideration in
exchange for the signing of such a covenant. As such, the distinction
drawn by the court as a result of its analysis may be somewhat arbitrary
although generally defensible.
The second theory offered by the supreme court to support its decision,
however, seems less persuasive. The court states that restrictive covenants associated with the sale of a business are not intended to restrict
competition, and, in fact, have little effect on restricting competition. The
opinion suggests that after the sale of the business, the business continues
to exist and do business with the public, and that the vendor can switch
businesses or pursue the same line of business in another locality. However, taken strictly, we find these arguments unpersuasive, as they seem
to apply equally to an employee.
The court suggests that restrictive covenants in connection with the
sale of the business are not intended to restrict competition and do not
restrict competition, as the business remains to serve the public. Whether
restrictive covenants in connection with the sale of the business are intended to restrict competition is a question which must at best remain
open. As to the second point, however, the court's distinction seems illusory. The court says that a restrictive covenant in connection with the
sale of a business is not anticompetitive because the sold business continues to serve the public. However, this would also appear to be true of a
business which loses an employee under the threat of a restrictive covenant. Indeed, there seems to be little difference between the effects on the
public of the two restrictive covenants. The fact that the vendor might
pursue another line of business seems little different from the employee's
ability to assume another line of work. Indeed, the sole difference would
be that the vendor might have funds from the sale of the business which
would allow him more flexibility. Thus, the sale of a business covenant
does not seem materially different from an employment covenant under
this theory.
The court's ruling in Jenkins is perhaps best understood as a distinction which is based upon the nature of that transaction and a generalization as to bargaining power. Indeed, although this rationale is not
explicit, the court's reference to Rita Personnel Services International,
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Inc. v. Kot 10 indicates that the court had this distinction in mind. By
rejecting the blue pencil theory of severability for restrictive covenants
ancillary to employment contracts, the supreme court seeks to prevent
employers from writing broad covenants not to compete with the knowledge that they will be enforced as reasonable. Thus, the court's rationale
as to employee covenants is to induce the employer to write the restrictive covenant as narrowly as possible, in the hopes that the contract will
be enforceable, thereby reducing the in terrorem effect on employees."
The court assumes, probably correctly in most cases, that the seller of a
business bargains for and receives consideration for this right in most
cases, and that the covenant in such a transaction therefore has no in
terrorem effect.
The court's distinction in Jenkins between restrictive covenants associated with employment agreements and those ancillary to the sale of a
business has already required interpretation where a contract appeared to
have elements of both employment and the sale of a business. In Redmond v. Royal Ford,Inc.,"1 the supreme court was faced with a restrictive
covenant included in a contract for employment which also gave the employee a ten percent stock interest, but provided for other stock interest
to be sold back to the company upon the employee's termination. The
employer argued that the covenant was ancillary to the sale of an interest
in a business and that it should be interpreted and upheld under Jenkins.
The court rejected this theory, holding that the contract was in fact executed in connection with employment, and related more to the purchase
of an interest in a business, than its possible eventual resale. In other
words, the court held that the existence of a repurchase option in the
contract would not in itself render the restrictive covenant subject to the
blue pencil theory of severability. As the court stated, that restrictive covenant "was not made by the seller in conjunction with the sale of the
business; it was made by the buyer in conjunction with the acquisition of
an interest in the business."' s This decision demonstrates the questions of
interpretation which will be faced by Georgia judges in light of the supreme court's distinction in Jenkins between restrictive covenants in employment contracts and sale of business contracts.
The court of appeals rejected an interesting theory supported by Cali1 4
fornia case law in Butts v. Atlanta FederalSavings & Loan Association.
In that case, the plaintiffs were a couple purchasing a home to be con10. 229 Ga. 314, 191 S.E.2d 79 (1972).
11. See Blake, Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 74 HARv. L. RE.. 625 (1960);
See, e.g., Rita Personnel Services Int'l, Inc. v. Kot, 229 Ga. 314, 191 S.E.2d 79 (1972).
12. 244 Ga.711, 261 S.E.2d 585 (1979).
13. Id. at 714, 261 S.E.2d at 588.
14. 152 Ga. App. 40, 262 S.E.2d 230 (1979).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

structed by a contractor who went bankrupt. The lender in that case was
required to perform periodic inspections to assess the degree of completion in connection with making periodic progress payments to the contractor based upon those inspections. Dissatisfied with the construction,
plaintiffs sued the lender for the damages resulting from defective workmanship, on the theory that the lender's inspections gave rise to a duty of
care towards plaintiffs. Relying upon Connor v. Great Western Savings &
Loan Association," a California case, plaintiffs argued that the lender's
inspections were not only to determine the degree of completion, but also
were intended to benefit plaintiffs by assuring quality workmanship.
The court of appeals rejected this theory, noting that plaintiffs had in
fact authorized disbursements to the contractor by their own signature,
and that the lending institution conducted its inspections for its own benefit and owed no special duty to plaintiff to protect it from defective construction. This result would seem to be the best view. In most cases the
construction lender does not owe any duty of vigilance over workmanship
to the purchaser, and no such duty is expected by the parties or written
into the contract. Indeed, there is no reason to expect lending institutions
to share the liability of a contractor's defective workmanship. The existence of a duty for one purpose cannot be interpreted as a duty for a
completely different purpose. While a lending institution has an interest
in the adequacy of construction, this interest does not require the lending
institution to undertake a general duty to protect the home buyers
through the lender's inspections, which are conducted for an entirely different purpose and solely for the benefit of the lender. It is worth noting
that the California Legislature has followed the Connor case by enacting
a statute's exempting lenders from liability to third parties arising from
defects in construction absent some rule beyond the lending of money or
some affirmative participation in misrepresentations with respect to the
construction. Thus, Georgia's decision on this issue leaves the Connor
case as it should be, an isolated exception to the general rule that the
lender owes no special duties to borrowers for the detection or reporting
of liability of a third party.
The supreme court used broad language in one of last year's decisions
to uphold the vesting of absolute discretion in one party to a contract.
The language used by the court in Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Anderson may be broader than necessary and may, as a result, create future
inequities. The case involved an employment contract specifying that the
company could pay incentive compensation to an employee in its sole dis15.
16.
17.

69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968).
CAL. Civ. CODE § 3434 (West 1970).
243 Ga. 867, 257 S.E.2d 283 (1979).
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cretion. When none was paid, and the employee voluntarily terminated
his employment, he sued for unpaid compensation, alleging that the company had a duty to exercise its discretion in good faith and without any
abuse of discretion. The court upheld the discretion vested in the contract, however, holding that the contract did not require any incentive
compensation and the company had retained the discretion to determine
what compensation would be paid. In doing so, the court used exceptionally broad language, which, if carried into other areas, would absolve parties of any responsibility to act in good faith or use discretion without
abuse. The court quoted the following language from a previous decision
of the court of appeals: "What the intent of the parties was in making the
contract must control; it is possible to so draw a contract as to leave decisions absolutely to the uncontrolled discretion of one of the parties and in
such a case the issue of good faith is irrelevant."18 The court continued,
"There can be no breach of an implied covenant of good faith where a
party to a contract has done what the provisions of the contract expressly
give him the right to do." 19
It is this broad language that is troubling. It is certainly true that in
this case the contract expressly provided no standard by which the employer was required to exercise discretion in determining the extent of
incentive compensation. In other cases there may be such a yardstick,
express or implied, giving rise to a duty of good faith in employing such
discretion. For example, a construction contract may call for the architect, as the owner's representative, to exercise his sole discretion in interpreting the plans and specifications. The plans and specifications themselves form a standard for their interpretation. If the language from
Anderson is applied to that situation, however, the architect would have
no good faith requirement to follow the intent of the plans and specifications. In fact, under this decision, the architect would be free to impose
any decision he desired for the owner, absent an express requirement that
he was to exercise that discretion in good faith. The authors note that
many contracts vest absolute power in a third party as an arbiter of disputes. The case under discussion, however, would give that right to a
party to the contract, without any requirement of fair dealing or good
faith. Such uncontrolled discretion may be appropriate here, where expressly reserved by the contract. We are concerned, however, about this
rule's possible application to other circumstances, where there has been
no such reservation. In those cases, we believe the contract should include
an implied condition of good faith.
Of course, it is possible to reconcile the example of the architect with
18.
19.

Id. at 868, 257 S.E.2d at 284 (citations omitted).
Id.
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Anderson by suggesting that the reference to or the existence of plans
and specifications might itself be a distinguishing factor, requiring good
faith in following the intent of such a document as an implied standard
where no such guidelines exist. Alternatively, the rule enunciated in Anderson may be limited to those situations where the contract clearly and
unambiguously vests absolute discretion upon one of the parties. This
limited interpretation is suggested in the penultimate paragraph of the
opinion, 0 distinguishing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Reich,"1 and further
supported by the court's more recent decision in Clear-Vu Cable, Inc. v.
Town of Trion,"2 which in another context adopted the view of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts that "[e]very contract imposes upon
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement.' 3 If, on the other hand, the court's intention is to render
absolute any vesting of discretion unless expressly qualified, then the
court will have imposed a substantial injustice on parties who agree to
vest discretion for an act or decision on one party, by precluding the requirement of good faith or noncapricious use of that discretion.
The supreme court ruled in Jim Walter Corp. v. Ward' that the reasonable diligence in uncovering fraud to toll the statute of limitations
should be measured by an objective standard. In that case, plaintiff
brought suit when it discovered the forgery of certain security deeds and
loan instruments by defendants. Defendants cited the statute of limitations as their primary defense. In order to avoid the statute,' for fraud,
defendants had to show, inter alia, that they had been reasonably diligent in discovering the cause of action. The trial court charged the jury
that "[iun determining whether the plaintiffs exercised the required degree of diligence to discover the actual fraud, you are authorized to consider all of the facts and circumstances of this case including the mental
capacity and education of the plaintiffs."' 6 The supreme court reversed
this decision, remanding it to the trial court for a new trial, stating that
reasonable diligence must be measured by an objective standard, as what
would have been understood by a reasonably prudent person. It is significant to note, however, that the court's standard is not an unyielding one.
In fact, although diligence is to be judged by an objective standard, the
court's opinion carefully notes that this objective standard must be ap-

20.
21.
22.

Id. at 869, 257 S.E.2d at 285.
131 Colo. 407, 282 P.2d 1091 (1955).
244 Ga. 790, 262 S.E.2d 73 (1979).
23. Id. at 792, 262 S.E.2d at 75, quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 231
(Tent. Draft).
24. 245 Ga. 355, 265 S.E.2d 7 (1980).
25. GA. CODE ANN. § 3-807 (Supp. 1980).
26. 245 Ga. at 356, 265 S.E.2d at 8.
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plied to the circumstances of each case. With this flexibility, the court
recognizes and gives the judge or jury the opportunity to consider the
circumstances which might make it more difficult for the reasonably prudent person to uncover fraud with reasonable diligence and thus avoid
the statute of limitations.

